Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

11-28-1955

People v. Tarantino [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People v. Tarantino [DISSENT]" (1955). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 184.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/184

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

590

PEOPLE V. TARANTINO

[Crim. No. 5705.

In Bank.

[45 C.2d

Nov. 28, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JAMES TARANTINO,
Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Use of Dictographs.-Pen. Code,
§ 653h, providing that "nothing herein shall prevent the use
and installation of dictographs" by peace officers in certain
cases, does not and cannot authorize violations of constitutional provisions relating to search and seizure.
[2] Id.-Use of Dictographs.-Installations of dictographs by police officers that violate the constitutional provisions relating to
search and seizure cannot be made lawful by authorization of
the head of the police department or the district attorney;
such provisions protect the people from unreasonable invasions
of their privacy by the police, and the determination of what
is reasonable cannot be left to the police.
[3] Id.-What Constitutes Violation of Constitutional Guaranties.
-A lawless search and seizure by a private person acting
in a private capacity is not a violation by a state or federal
agency of constitutional guaranties.
[4] Id.-What Constitutes Violation of Constitutional Guaranties.
-An engineer's installation of a microphone in defendant's
room as an agent of the district attorney and the police department, while working under direct supervision of an inspector of police and being paid with public funds, and clandestine eavesdropping by the police, violate the constitutional
provisions relating to search and seizure.
[5] Extortion- Appeal- Reversible Error- Evidence.-The admission of illegally obtained recordings from a microphone
secretly installed in defendant's room resulted in a miscarriage of justice in an extortion case necessitating a new
trial as to the counts based on occurrences subsequent to the
installation of such microphone, where the recordings contained evidence immediately and directly tending to prove the
charged offenses, such as the names of the complaining witnesses and defendant's remarks connecting these witnesses
with threats and demands for money.
[6] Id.-Evidence.-A conviction of extortion on a count based
on an act occurring before a microphone was secretly and un[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [5]
Extortion, § 10; [6, 10, 11] Extortion, § 8; [7] Criminal Law,
§ 1285(1); [8, 9] Criminal Law,§ 525.5; [12] Witnesses, § 135(4);
[13] Criminal Law, § 349.
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lawfully installed in defendant's room is sustained, independently ~f any evidence obtained by use of such microphone,
by the victim's testimony that defendant demanded and received money from him under a threat to "blast" him on a
radio program if he did not pay, and by the testimony of other
victims of extortions showing the pattern of defendant's criminal operations.
[7] Criminal Law-Appeal-Presumptions-Jury-Following Instructions.- Where the jury in an extortion case were instructed that each count set forth in the indictment charged
a separate and distinct offense and that they must state their
findings as to each count in a separate verdict uninfluenced
by the mere fact that their verdict as to any other count was
for or against defendants, it must be presumed that the jury
obeyed such instruction and were not influenced to return a
guilty verdict as to one count on evidence other than that
pertinent to such count.
[ 8] !d.-Evidence-Sound Recordation.-Defendant may not successfully urge that he was denied a reasonable opportunity
to hear and decipher illegally obtained sound recordings before or after excerpts therefrom were received in evidence,
where defense counsel were offered and did not avail themselves of opportunities to hear the recordings.
[9] !d.-Evidence-Sound Recordation.-Defendant may not successfully urge that the court should have granted his requests
for copies of transcriptions, prepared by the prosecution, of
those portions of sound recordings of his conversations which
were not introduced in evidence where he does not suggest what
useful purpose would have been served by his counsel's hearing
the recordings or reading the transcriptions, and where he
does not suggest that they contained anything relevant to
the case.
[10] Extortion-Evidence.-Evidence tending to show extortions
and attempted extortions other than those charged is admissible where it tends to show criminal methods and purposes
similar to those shown by the victim's testimony.
[11] Id.-Evidence.-In an extortion case it was proper to admit
in evidence issues of defendant's magazine which were found
in his room at the time of his arrest, where the magazine was
shown by other evidence to have been an instrumentality
by which defendant carried out his threats to "blast" his
victims, and where the victims were "told" to advertise in the
magazine.
[12] Witnesses - Cross-examination - Scope and Extent.-Where
defendant on direct examination testified in effect that he
did not commit the extortions charged, the prosecution properly cross-examined him as to other, similar offenses to which
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he had not referred in his testimony in chief, since the crossexamination was directed primarily to matters implicit in defendant's general denial, i.e., his purpose and motive, his general plan and scheme.
[13] Criminal Law-Jury-Instructions After Submission of Case.
-Statements of trial judge and advice to jury, whose foreman
expressed inability to agree on any count in an extortion
case, to consider the case dispassionately, to put aside any ill
feeling or animosity they may have, that he would not countenance physical violence among them, that they need not be
in agreement as to all counts, and that it was their duty to
deliberate until the court excused them could not be construed
as showing that the verdicts of guilty were coerced, where
the judge did not require the jury to prolong their deliberations unduly in view of the fact that the trial had consumed
44 days, and where he dealt properly with the suggested
"bodily harm to one or more jurors."

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying
a new trial. Eustace Cullinan, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part
and in part reversed and remanded for new trial.
Prosecution for conspiracy to commit extortion and for
extortion. Judgment of conviction affirmed as to one count
charging extortion, and reversed and remanded for new trial
as to other counts charging extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion.
Leo R. Friedman for Appellant.
Charles R. Garry and George Olshausen as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
Thomas C. Lynch, District Attorney (San Francisco) as
Amicus Curiae lln behalf of Respondent.
THE COURT.-Defendants Tarantino and Eichenbaum
were indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit extortion
(Pen. Code, § 182) and three counts of extortion (Pen. Code,
§ 518). Defendant Tarantino alone appeals from a judgment
of conviction entered on a jury verdict of guilty on all four
counts and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
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Tarantino (herein sometimes called defendant) published
a weekly magazine and made weekly radio broadcasts. Nine
witnesses testified that they had been "blasted" or threatened
with "blasting" by defendant, but that he stopped his attacks
and threats after they paid money to Eichenbaum, sponsored
advertisements in defendant's magazine, and, in one case,
agreed to sell the magazine to the public. Much of the evidence against defendant consisted of recordings of conversations in his hotel room introduced over objection that they
had been obtained in violation of the provisions of the United
States Constitution and the California Constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizures. An inspector in the San
Francisco Police Department testified that at the suggestion
of the district attorney and the chief of inspectors he employed
a sound engineer and had a locksmith make a key to defendant's hotel room. In December, 1951, the engineer, acting
under the direction of the inspector and using the key that
the locksmith made, entered defendant's room and installed
a microphone behind a small hole in the ceiling. Wires from
the microphone were strung up the airshaft, across adjacent
roofs, and into an apartment that the police and district
attorney had rented in a nearby building. The inspector and
the engineer testified that they acted without defendant's
knowledge or permission. From December, 1951, until February, 1953, the police listened to every sound that was made
in defendant's room. They did not consider all of the conversations they overheard relevant to the investigation, but recorded only those they considered "pertinent" and "interesting.'' The recordings, totalling 198 reels of tape or
approximately 500 hours of listening time, were edited by
the district attorney and the police, arranged according to
subject matter, and rerecorded in part on composite tapes.
The district attorney introduced 60 selected excerpts in evidence, and since they related to threats, promises, and
demands for money, they constituted corroborative evidence
of the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses.
Defendant contends that this evidence was obtained by unconstitutional means (Irvine v. California (1954), 347 U.S.
128, 132 [74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561] ; Wolf v. Colorado
( 1949), 338 U.S. 25, 27 [69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782])
and should therefore have been excluded (People v. Cahan
(1955), 44 Cal.2d 434, 444 [282 P.2d 905]; People v. Berger
( 1955), 44 Cal.2d 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509]). The district
attorney contends, however, that section 653h of the Penal
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Code permits the police to install and use a
as
was done in this case and that unless the section is unconstitutional the recordings were not obtained in violation of
the Constitutions. [1] Section 653h provides that "Any
person who, without the consent of the . . . occupant, installs
or attempts to install or use a dictograph in any house, room,
[or] apartment . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor; provided,
that nothing herein shall prevent the use and installation
of dictographs by a regular salaried peace officer expressly
authorized thereto by the head of his office or department
or by a district attorney, when such use and installation are
necessary in the performance of their duties in detecting
crime and in the apprehension of criminals." It was pointed
out in People v. Cahan, sttpra, that this section "does not
and could not authorize violations of the Constitution" and
that the proviso under which the officers in that case and this
case ''purported to act at most prevents their conduct from
constituting a violation of that section itself." ( 44 Cal.2d
at 437.) Since the statute does not purport to authorize
any installations whatever, to interpret the proviso as authorizing conduct that the Constitution prohibits would not only
render it subject to attack on that ground (Irvine v. California (1954), supra, 347 U.S. 128, 132), but read into it
words that are not there. [2] Moreover, installations by
police officers that violate the constitutional provisions cannot
be made lawful by the authorization of the head of the police
department or the district attorney. Those provisions protect
the people from unreasonable invasions of their privacy by
the police, and the determination of what is reasonable cannot
be left to them. ''Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen
and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor
to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was
done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to
invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest
of criminals." (McDonald v. United States (1948), 335
U.S. 451, 455 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153] ; see also United
States v. Jeffers (1951), 342 U.S. 48, 51 [72 S.Ct. 93, 96
hEd. 59]; Johnson v. United States (1948), 333 U.S. 10, 14
[68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436]; United States v. Lefkowitz
( 1932), 285 U.S. 452, 464 [52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82
A.L.R. 775]; Drayton v. United States (1953), 205 F.2d
35, 37.)
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that the secret
of defendant's room
of the microphone were done
the engineer,
a private person, and that a lawless search and sei.zure by a
private person acting in a private capacity is not a violation
by a state or federal agency of constitutional guaranties.
(Burdeatl
!JlcDoweU (1921), 256 U.S. 465, 475 [41 S.Ct.
574, 65 L.Ed. 1048, 13 A.L.R.
.) [4] The engineer.
however, was employed by the district attorney and the police
department He worked under the direct supervision of an
inspector of police, and was paid with public funds. Accordingly, his installation of the microphone as an agent of public
officials and the clandestine eavesdropping by the police violated the constitutional provisions. (hvine v. California
(1954), supra, 347 U.S. 128, 132; Wolf v. Colorado (1949),
supra, 338 U.S. 25, 27.) Evidence so obtained must be excluded. (People v. Cahan (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 444;
People v. Bm·ger (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 459, 462.)
The People contend, however, that the admission of the
evidence did not result in a miscarriage of justice and that
the judgment must therefore be affirmed. (Cal. Const., art.
VI, § 4%.) In support of this contention it is urged that
the verdicts were supported by the testimony of 21 witnesses,
that several of these witnesses testified that defendant committed acts of extortion similar to those with which he was
charged, and that one of tbe acts of extortion for which he
was indicted, that charged in Count 2, occurred before the
microphone was hidden in his room. As to Count 2 it appears
to us that the evidence, entirely indepen(le:ut of that illegally
obtained, convincingly, if not ovenvhelmingly, establishes
guilt, and, for the reasons hereinafter more particularly
stated, we conclude that the verdict on this count should
not be disturbed.
[5] As to Counts 1 (conspiracy of defendants Tarantino
and Eichenbaum to commit extortion), 3 (extortion from
Rourke), and 4 (extortion from Armstrong), the illegally
obtained recordings contain evidence immediately and directly
tending to prove the charged offenses. The 60 excerpts of
illegally obtained recordings were played repeatedly to the
court and jury. They contained the names of the complaining
witnesses and defendant's recorded remarks connected these
names, insofar as Connts 1, 3 and 4 are concerned, with
threats and demands for money. Sinee the reeordings elearly
constituted a substantial and important part of the evidence
pertinent to the last mentioned counts, it cannot be said
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that the verdicts as to those counts rested on evidence independent of them. (See Stevens v. Snow (1923), 191 Cal.
58, 67 [214 P. 968] .) Accordingly their admission in evidence
deprived the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a
miscarriage of justice which necessitates a new trial as to
such counts.
[6] The circumstances of the commission of the offense
against Paul Vlasoff, Count 2, as related in his testimony,
are as follows: He had known Tarantino and Eichenbaum
since 1950. In 1950 Eichenbaum came into the Club Continental, a bar opera ted by VIas off, and "told" Vlasoff to
put an advertisement in Tarantino's magazine, Hollywood
Life. Vlasoff said that he did not care to advertise his bar
in Tarantino's magazine. Eichenbaum said, "You don't have
to do that, just put a blood bank ad in there." Vlasoff agreed
to place the advertisement and paid $25.
In 1951 Vlasoff operated both the Club Continental and a
card room. Eichenbaum came into the card room in July
or August, 1951, and said that Tarantino was "awfully mad"
at Vlasoff and was going to ''blast'' him on his radio program
the next day. At Vlasoff's request Eichenbaum placed a
telephone call to Tarantino and Vlasoff talked with him.
Tarantino told Vlasoff that Vlasoff was ''getting away with
murder, booking horses, and a crap game," and that Tarantino was going to "blast" him. Vlasoff said, "What can
I do to make up? . . . I don't want you to blast me on the
air tomorrow, otherwise I'll have to close up the place."
'rarantino replied that Vlasoff should talk with Eichenbaum.
Eichenbaum talked further with Tarantino on the telephone,
then told Vlasoff that Tarantino would "forget the incident"
for $500. Vlasoff protested against the amount. After further negotiations they agreed upon a figure of $200. Also
Eichenbaum told Vlasoff, "you will have to put an ad in
there to keep him quiet." Vlasoff agreed to this. He paid
the $200 and was billed for but did not pay for an advertisement in Hollywood Life.
As stated, the offense charged in Count 2 occurred, according to the testimony of Vlasoff, in July or August, 1951.
The listening and recording device by which evidence was
illegally obtained was not installed until December, 1951.
'fhere is no mention in the evidence obtained by the device
of the alleged offense against Vlasoff. There is brief mention
by Tarantino in one of his recorded conversations of "Paul"
and "the Continental" but it is not in connection with any
extortion.
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Independently of the recordings, the effect of Vlasoff's
testimony describing the commission of the offense against
him is impressively strengthened by the testimony of other
witnesses, the victims of Counts 3 and 4 and the victims of
extortions not charged against the defendants, showing the
pattern of defendant's criminal operations. This admissible
evidence of other offenses is of such probative, corroborative
effect that the record as a whole, notwithstanding its further
content of illegally obtained evidence, falls short of leading
us to the opinion that as to this count of the indictment
(Count 2), defendant's conviction can be said to constitute
a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41;2.)
[7] In this connection it is to be noted that the jury were
instructed that "Each count set forth in the Indictment
charges a separate and distinct offense. You must consider
the evidence applicable to each alleged offense as though it
were the only accusation before you for consideration, and
you must state your finding as to each count in a separate
verdict, uninfluenced by the mere fact that your verdict
as to any other count or counts is in favor of, or against, the
defendants. They may be convicted or acquitted upon any
or all of the offenses charged, depending upon the evidence
and the weight you give to it, under the Court's instructions."
It is to be presumed that the jury obeyed this instruction
and was not influenced to return a guilty verdict as to
Count 2 upon evidence other than that pertinent to this count.
(People v. Dabb (1948), 32 Cal.2d 491, 499 [197 P.2d 1] [it
must be assumed that the jury followed instructions that
evidence as to offenses of codefendants which was not connected with defendant could not be considered against him] ;
People v. Lamendola (1953), 119 Cal.App.2d 570, 572 [259
P.2d 982] [it must be presumed that the jury followed instructions that they were to consider certain evidence solely
for the purpose of impeachment] ; People v. Grimes (1952),
113 Cal.App.2d 365, 371 [248 P.2d 130] ["It will be presumed that the jurors were true to their oaths and followed
the various admonitions and instructions of the court,''
particularly with reference to evidence of prior similar offenses]; People v. Martinez (1937), 19 Cal.App.2d 599, 604
[66 P.2d 161] [it may be assumed that the jury followed
the instruction that the extrajudicial statement of each defendant could be considered only as to him and not as to his
codefendants]; People v. Griffin (1935), 9 Cal.App.2d 246,
249 [49 P.2d 321] [it must be assumed that jury heeded
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the instruction that evidence
defendant
can be considered
as
that
.)
In addition to the claim that the
were inadmissible because they were illegally obtained, defendant
other contentions. [8] He urges that he was denied a
the illegally
reasonable opportunity to hear and
obtained recordings before or after
therefrom were
received in evidence. The record shows that defense counsel
were offered and did not avail themselves of opportunities
to hear the recordings. [9] Defendant urges, further, that
the court should have granted his requests for copies of transcriptions, prepared by the prosecution, of those portions of
the recordings which were not introduced in evidence. Defendant, whose conversations were the subject of the recordings and transcriptions, does not suggest what useful purpose
would have been served by his counsel's hearing the recordings or reading the transcriptions: he does not suggest that
they contained anything relevant to this case.
[10] Defendant complains of the admission of evidence,
some properly and some illegally obtained, which tends to
show extortions and attempted extortions other than those
charged. Such evidence is relevant to the Vlasoff extortion
for it tends to show criminal methods and purposes similar
to those shown by the testimony of Vlasoff. (See People v.
Costa (1953), 40 Cal.2d 160. 167 [252 P.2d 1], and cases
there cited.) Accordingly, such of it as was legally obtained
was properly admitted; the portions of it which were unlawfully obtained were merely cumulative of the proof, which
as hereinabove discussed, satisfactorily establishrs guilt on
Count 2 independently of the evidence improperly admitted.
[11] Defendant complains of the admission in evidence
of approximately 200 issues of his magazine, Hollywood Life,
which were found in his room at the time of his arrest. These
magazines are clearly relevant and in themselves constitute
overwhelming proof of certain of the elements in the case
against defendant. He argues, however, that prejudice from
the admission of this evidence appears from the facts that
the magazines contained not only relevant material but also
material not relevant to tl1e crimz•s charged and that the
jury asked for and were allowed to have th:> magazines in
the jury room during their deliberations. Defendant's original objection to the introduction of this evidence was on
the sole ground that the prosecution had not shown that
defendant edited or wrote the material in HoUywood Life.
The prosecution had shown, however, that defendant was its
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defendant asked that the magazines
be excluded from evidence and
that only such portions as were pertinent should be received in evidence. The
magazines as a whole. and not merely selected portions thereof.
were relevant since, as shown by other evidence, they were
an instrumentality by which defendant carried out his threats
to "blast" his victims and the victims, as Vlasoff testified,
were "told" to advertise in the magazine.
[12] Tarantino on direct examination testified in effect
that he did not commit the extortions charged. The prosecution, over objection, cross-examined him as to other, similar
offenses to which he had not referred in his testimony in
chief. He contends that his cross-examination improperly
went beyond "matters about which he was examined in
chief" (Pen. Code, § 1323). The contention is without merit.
Since Tarantino's testimony on direct examination amounted
to a general denial of the truth of the charges against him,
"the permissible scope of cross-examination is very wide."
(People v. Zerrillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222,228 [223 P.2d 223].)
'rhe cross-examination here was directed primarily to matters
implicit in Tarantino's general denial, i.e., his purpose and
motive, his general plan and scheme.
[13] Defendant urges that the following circumstances
show that the verdicts were coerced : The jury retired to
deliberate on the morning of December 18 and the verdicts
were returned on the evening of December 22. At 4 p. m. on
December 19 the jury came into court after they had sent
the judge a note signed by the foreman which stated, "We
cannot agree on any count.'' The foreman told the judge
that the division of the jury was nine to three. (At no time
was it disclosed how many votes were for acquittal and
how many for conviction.)
At 10 :40 a. m. on December 21 the foreman gave the judge
a note which stated that the jury "stand 11 to 1, and no
ehance of a change''; another juror had written, ''Any
further argument is very likely to result in bodily harm to
one or more jurors." The judge instructed the jury at some
length to eonsider the case dispassionately, and said, "I
might just say, and this is not a threat, that if any juror
inflicts any bodily harm on any other juror, I certainly
would take care of that situation and deal with it in a manner
that would make the offender very sorry that the incident
occurred, if it does occur. Now, that is not a threat; that is
just a rather blunt statement. but I beg all of you to put
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aside any ill feeling that you might have, if you have any. . . .
You are not partisans or advocates but judges. Now, ifdon't let any feeling of pride or feeling of personal hurt
or animosity prevent you from discussing this case with calmness and with equanimity."
On December 22 the judge received three notes. One,
written by the foreman on the night of December 21, stated,
''deliberation is proceeding in a friendly atmosphere. We
are determined to continue in this manner whether we eventually reach a verdict or not." A note from a juror, marked
3 :35 p. m., December 22, stated, ''The opposed juror states
he is withholding information from us until tomorrow morning. He states he is protecting three interests, the State,
the defense and the jury." And another note from the foreman, also marked 3:35 p.m., December 22, stated, "We are
not deliberating now and have not been deliberating during
many long periods of time previous to this. . . . It is the
opinion of everyone that we cannot do any more."
At 4 :30 p. m. the judge called the jury into the courtroom
and said, "Now, it is your duty, under your oaths as jurors,
to deliberate, and to refuse to discuss the case further is
a violation of your oaths as jurors. I know that you have
been very patient and have been here a long time, and maybe
tempers wear thin, but it is your duty to deliberate until
the court excuses you.'' The judge pointed out that the
jury need not be in agreement as to all counts and asked
them to deliberate ''somewhat further.'' At 8 :45 p. m. they
returned with the verdicts.
There was nothing in the statements of the trial judge,
representative portions of which are quoted above, which
suggested an opinion as to what verdicts should be reached,
nor was there any improper pressure upon the jury to agree.
( Cf. People v. Walker (1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 818, 821-825
[209 P.2d 834], and cases there cited and summarized; People
v. Crowley (1950), 101 Cal.App.2d 71,75-78 [224 P.2d 748].)
It does not appear that the judge required the jury to prolong their deliberations unduly, particularly in view of the
fact that the trial had consumed 44 days. The judge dealt
properly with the suggested "bodily harm to one or more
jurors.'' We conclude that the record does not support defendant's claim that the verdicts were coerced.
Other arguments of defendant do not relate to matters
which could have had a prejudicial effect as to the conviction
upon Count 2 and need not be specifically discussed.
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The judgment and order on Count 2 are affirmed; on
Counts 1, 3 and 4 the
and order are reversed and
the cause is remanded for a new trial.
SPENCE, J.-1 concur.
'rhe majority opinion reverses as to counts 1, 3, and 4
upon the authority of People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282
P.2d 905], and People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459 [282 P.2d
:J09]. I dissented in those cases and my views remain unehanged concerning the undesirability there of departing from
the previously established nonexclusionary rule. Nevertheless.
the majority there decided that the earlier cases should be
overruled, and that the exclusionary rule should be adopted.
Since the decision of the cited cases, the exclusionary rule
has become the rule in this state governing the admissibility
of evidence; and the trial courts have been required to
accept and apply it. I have reluctantly determined that I
should now yield to the views of the majority and accept the
exclusionary rule as the established rule.
The reasons for my determination may be briefly stated.
'l'he exclusionary rule, as established by the Cahan and Berger
decisions, is admittedly merely ''a rule of evidence.'' (People
v. Cahan, S1tpra, p. 450.) Concerning the desirability of
adopting the exclusionary rule, there has been sharp disagreement throughout the years among the best legal minds.
It being merely a rule of evidence, I believe that the paramount consideration now, in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice in this state, is that there be a
firmly established rule which will not be subject to change
from time to time with the possible change in the views of
a single member of this court. My vie1YS respecting the desirability of adhering to an established rule constituted one
of the reasons for my dissent in the Cahan and Berger cases.
In the situation now confronting me, that same reason would
seem to indicate that I should accept the rule established
by the majority opinions in those cases.
Furthermore, it is clear from the opinion in the Cahan
case, that this court still has before it the difficult task of
adopting "workable rules" to supplement the general exclusionary rule. (People v. Cahan, supra, p. 451.) Numerous
cases are now pending here involving the determination of
such workable rules. Other pending cases, like the present
one, call for a determination of the question of whether
the admission of evidence, which should have been excluded
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under the exclusionary rule, has resulted in a miscarriage
of justice. ( Const., art. VI, § 4%.) It appears desirable
that all members of this court should participate in the
determination of the numerous questions presented by the
pending cases, and it further appears that full participation
by any member of this court in the determination of many
of these important questions will be possible only if such
member is willing to accept the exclusionary rule as the
established rule. If perchance, either the exclusionary rule
itself, or any other rule that this court may adopt to supplement it, should prove unsatisfactory, it is within the province
of the Legislature to deal with this important evidentiary
problem in such manner as it may deem appropriate.
Edmonds, J ., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
I would reverse the judgment and order on all counts.
Defendants were convicted of four crimes alleged to be part
of an extensive criminal venture whereby Tarantino used
threats of exposure by magazine and radio to extort money
from his victims. Since the victims were of unsavory character, to convince the jury, it was necessary for the prosecution to substantiate its case by evidence that the victims were
telling the truth. It accomplished this purpose by introducing 60 excerpts of illegally obtained recordings of conversations that took place in Tarantino's room. These
recordings permeated the prosecution's case, and the record
demonstrates that they weighed heavily with the jury in
substantiating the testimony of the victims. After the jury
had been out for over a day, the jurors reported that they
could not agree on any count of the indictment. Thereafter
excerpts of the recordings were repeatedly played to them at
their request, and not until after four days of deliberation
were they able to reach a verdict.
The majority opinion concedes that under these circumstances the admission of the illegally obtained evidence was
prejudicial as to three of the counts. It concludes, however, that as to Count 2, no prejudice is shown. It reaches
1his conclusion on the following grounds: (1) The alleged
Vlasoff extortion occurred before the microphone was hidden
in Tarantino's room, and there ''is no mention in the evidence obtained by the device of the alleged offense against
Vlaso:ff." (2} Vlasoff's testimony is "impressively strength-
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cued
of other
the victims of Counts
3 and 4 and the victims of extortions not charged against the
defendants, showing the pattern of defendant's criminal
operations." ( 3) The jury was instructed that "Each count
set forth in the Indictment charges a separate and distinct
offense. You must consider the evidence applicable to each
alleged offense as though it were the only accusation before
you for consideration, and you must state your finding as
to each count in a separate verdict; uninfluenced by the mere
fact that your verdict as to any other count or counts is in
favor of, or against, the defendants. They may be convicted
or acquitted upon any or all of the offenses charged, depending upon the evidence and the weight you give to it, under
the Court's instruction." (4) "It is to be presumed that the
jury obeyed this instruction and was not influenced to return
a guilty verdict as to Count 2 upon evidence other than that
pertinent to this count." When these grounds are viewed in
the light of the record they demonstrate that the admission
of the illegally obtained evidence was just as prejudicial with
respect to the \TJ.asoff count as it was with respect to the
others.
Vlasoff testified that during the pendency of the present
proceedings he had been indicted for attempting to steal
money by means of fraudulent and marked cards and loaded
dice, that he had been a pimp living off the earnings of prostitutes, and that he had been arrested at different times for
vagrancy, pimping, gambling, and after-hours sales of liquor.
He also admitted committing perjury for $1,000 by signing a
false affidavit. Had his testimony stood alone, it is doubtful
that it would have convinced the jury of defendants' guilt on
Count 2. \Vhat other evidence would the jury consider '' pertinent to this count"~ It would consider the same evidence
that the majority opinion considers relevant to sustain the
conviction on Count 2, namely, the evidence ''showing the
pattern of defendant's criminal operations," evidence that,
with respect to crimes not charged, was only admissible because it was relevant as showing ''criminal methods and purposes similar to those shown by the testimony of Vlasoff.''
Inextricably intermixed with the admissible relevant evidence
of other crimes was the inadmissible evidence of those crimes
provided by the recordings. The jury could not rationally
determine whether the testimony of the other victims "im:pressively strengthened" Vlasoff's testimony until it determined whether those victims were telling the truth, and it
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would inevitably turn to the recordings in
that determination.
The judgment in this case must stand or fall as a whole.
Since all of the offenses charged were part of one pattern of
alleged criminal conduct, evidence of each offense was relevant
to prove all of the others. The indictment itself listed defendants' conversations with Vlasoff as overt acts of the
conspiracy charged in Count 1. In reaching its verdict on
Count 2 the jury was not required so to compartmentalize
the evidence as to disregard the evidence on the other counts,
for the evidence on the other counts, including the illegally
obtained evidence, was not only relevant but ''pertinent''
to Count 2, and indeed, the majority opinion itself relies on
the legally obtained evidence on the other counts to affirm
the conviction on Count 2. Since the jury was instructed to
consider all of the relevant evidence, it cannot be assumed
that in reaching its verdict on Count 2 it relied solely on the
legally obtained evidence on the other counts to substantiate
Vlasoff's testimony and disregarded the illegally obtained
evidence on those counts. Nor can it be assumed that it relied
on both classes of evidence in reaching its verdict on Counts
1, 3, and 4 but only on legally obtained evidence in reaching
its verdict on Count 2. The conclusion is inescapable that
if the admission of the illegally obtained evidence was prejudicial as to Counts 1, 3, and 4, it was also prejudicial as
to Count 2.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Mr.
Justice Traynor in his dissenting opinion, and I do not
believe it is possible for anyone to say with any degree of
sincerity or conviction that the conceded error in the admission of material evidence unlawfully obtained does not
permeate the entire record and equally affect the determination of the jury as to Count 2 as well as to the other counts.
This must be apparent when we consider the effect of the
instruction given by the court to the jury relative to the
evidence offered of other similar offenses which the prosecution claims the defendant bad committed.* In view of
*''Evidence was offered in this case for the purpose of showing that
the defendants committed other crimes than the ones of which they are
accused, and for which they are on trial in this action. Such evidence
was received for a limited purpose only, not to prove distinct offenses
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this instruction it must be assumed that the jury considered
all of the illegally obtained evidence for whatever bearing
''it might nave on the question of whether defendants are
innocent M guilty of any crime charged against them in this
action'' anJ if such illegally obtained evidence tended to
show that dt-fendant had a motive for the offense charged
against him 1n Count 2, or that he entertained the intent
which is a n-ecessary element of said offense, or that he
possessed kno;vledge that might have been useful in the
commission of &'lid offense, or that there existed in his mind
a plan, scheme, system or design which fitted into the commission of said vffense, or that there existed in his mind a
consciousness of guilt, it would be relied upon to establish
his guilt of the ort'.-mse charged in Count 2. Certainly it cannot
be said that the tremendous volume of illegally obtained
evidence which was offered by the prosecution in this case
did not tend to establish some or all of the above mentioned
elements of the offense charged in Count 2, and therefore
I think it is only fair to assume that the illegally obtained
evidence admitted o¥er the objection of defendant weighed
heavily with the jmy in determining the guilt of the defendant Tarantino of the crime charged in Count 2. In
view of this clear an•J obvious situation I do not think it
can fairly be said that the admission of this evidence did not
result in a miscarriage <lf justice as to Count 2 but did result
in a miscarriage of just.ice as to Counts 1, 3 and 4.
Without considering the effect of the above quoted instruction relating to the .lpplicability of the illegally obtained
evidence to Count 2, the majority opinion states : ''The sixty
excerpts of illegally obtained recordings were played reor continued criminality, but for such bearing, if any, as it might have
on the question whether defei.tdants are innocent or guilty of any crime
charged against them in this nction.
"You are not permitted to consider that evidence for any other purpose, and as to that purpose, you must weigh such evidence as you
do all other in the case. You are not permitted to consider that evidence
for any other purpose. The value, if any, of such evidence, depends on
whether it tends to show, first, that the defendants had a motive for
the commission of the offense charged against them in this action, or.
second, that the defendants entertained the intent which is a necessary
element of the alleged crime fo1 which they are now on trial, as pointed
out in these instructions, or, third. that the defendants possessed knowl
edge that might have been useful in the commission of any crime for
which they are now on trinl; o~, fourth, that there existed in the mind~
of the defendants a plnn, sclwme, system or design, into which fitted
the commission of the offense for which they are now on trial; or, fifth.
that there existed in the minds of the defendants a consciousness of
guilt."
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peatedly to the court and jury. They contained the names
of the complaining witnesses and defendant's recorded remarks connected these names, insofar as Counts 1, 3 and 4
are concerned, with threats and demands for money. Since
the recordings clearly constituted a substantial and important
part of the evidence pertinent to the last mentioned counts,
it cannot be said that the verdicts as to those counts rested
on evidence independent of them. (See Stevens v. Snow
(1923), 191 Cal. 58, 67 [214 P. 968].) Accordingly their
admission in evi,lence
the defendant of a fair trial
and resulted in a miscarriage of justice which necessitates
a new trial as to such counts.'' As justification for its holding
that the admission of the illegally obtained evidence deprived
the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage
of justice which necessitates a new trial as to Counts 1, 3
and 4, but not as to Count 2, the majority opinion states:
"Independently of the recordings, the effect of Vlasoff 's
testimony describing the commission of the offense against
him is impressively strengthened by the testimony of other
witnesses, the victims of Counts 3 and 4 and the victims of
extortions not charged against the defendants, showing the
pattern of defendant's criminal operations. This admissible
evidence of other offenses is of such probative, corroborative
effect that the record as a whole, notwithstanding its further
content of illegally obtained evidcnee, falls short of leading
us to the opinion that as to this count of the indictment
(Count 2), defendant's conviction can be said to constitute
a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%.)" The
majority opinion then discusses the effect of the instructions
given by the court to the jury with respect to the weighing
of the evidence as to each count in the indictment and the
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence as to each
count independent of the other, and concludes that it must
be presumed that the jury followed these instructions. But
the majority makes no mention of the instruction hereinabove
quoted and the effect such instruction might have in causing
the jury to give consideration to the illegally obtained evidence in arriving at their verdict as to Count 2. I am disposed
to agree with the majority that it must be presumed that
the jury followed the instructions of the court, but in so
doing they would be required to give consideration to much
if not all of the illegally obtained evidence in their determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the offense
charged in Count 2, and therefore if, as the majority hold,
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defendant of a
fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice as to
Counts 1, 3 and 4, it is inescapable that a fair and honest
consideration of the record points unerringly to the same
conclusion as to Count 2.
Since the majority here invokes section 4% of article VI
of the Constitution of California as the basis for its holding
that the judgment as to Count 2 should be affirmed, I think
it might be well to give consideration to the applicability
of this provision to the case at bar. In my opinion section
4% of article VI of the Constitution of California postulates
a wise and salutary coneept of appellate review in both
eriminal and eivil cases. Its adoption marked a departure
from the rigid application of teehnical rules which had been
previously invoked by this court and which had resulted in
the reversal of judgments in eriminal cases where there was
seareely any doubt as to the guilt of the defendant and it
was obvious that form rather than substance was playing
too dominant a role in the decisions of our courts. Hence the
people saw fit in the adoption of this provision to write into
the Constitution the concept that a reviewing court should
not reverse a judgment because of a mere teehnical error
which did not go to the merits of the case or could not possibly affect the result and thereby enjoined upon the reviewing court the duty to examine the entire record and
determine therefrom whether or not the error complained
of had resulted in a miscarriage of justice before ordering
a reversal of the judgment. 'l'his amendment was adopted
about the time that I began the practice of law, and I believed
at the time of its adoption and still believe that it constituted
a major salutary step in the administration of justice in
this state. While this constitutional provision has not been
applied with uniformity by our courts, I think the best
reasoned cases have uniformly held that it cannot be invoked
to cure an error which affeets the substantial rights of the
litigant, or, in other words, an error which might affect the
•letermination of a material issue in a case. As early as
1913 this court speaking through Mr. Justice Sloss in the case
of People v. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55, at pages 65-66 [130 P. 1042],
made the following illuminating observations with reference
to the application of this section to the review of a judgment
of conviction in a criminal case: "This much, however, we
think may be safely said. Section 41/ 2 of article VI of our
constitution must be given at !0ast the effect of abrogating
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the old rule that
is
from any error of
law. Where error is shown it is the duty of the court to
examine the evidence and ascertain from such examination
whether the error did or did not in fact work any injury.
'l'he mere fact of error does not make out a prima facie case
for reversal which must be overcome by a clear showing that
no injury could have resulted.
''On the other hand, we do not understand that the amendment in question was designed to repeal or abrogate the
guaranties accorded persons accused of crime by other parts
of the same constitution or to overthrow all statutory rules
of procedure and evidence in criminal cases. ·when we speak
of administering 'justice' in criminal cases, under the English or American system of procedure, we mean something
more than merely ascertaining whether an accused is or is
not guilty. It is an essential part of justice that the question
of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal
procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected. For example, if a court should
undertake to deny to a defendant charged with a felony the
right of trial by jury, and after a hearing of the evidence
render a judgment of conviction, it cannot be doubted that
such judgment should be set aside even though there had
been the clearest proof of guilt. Or, if a defendant, after
having been once acquitted, should be again brought to trial
and thereupon convicted, in disregard of his plea that he
had been once in jeopardy, it would hardly be suggested
that because he was in fact guilty, no 'miscarriage of justice'
had occurred.''
In People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Cal.2d 7, 11 [161 P.2d 934],
decided in 1945, this court d0clared: "When a defendant
has been denied any essential element of a fair trial or due
process, even the broad saving provisions of section 41/z of
article VI of our state Constitution cannot remedy the vice
and the judgment cannot stand. (People v. Mahoney, 201
Cal. 618. 627 [258 P. 607) ; People v. Adams, 76 Cal.App.
178, 186-187 [244 P. 106]; People v. Gilliland, 39 Cal.App.2d
250, 264 [103 P.2d 179]; People v. Duvernay, 43 Cal.App.2d
823, 829 [ 111 P .2d 659].) That section was not designed to
'abrogate the guaranties accorded persons accused of crimP
by other parts of the same constitution or to overthrow all
statutory rules of procedure and evidence in criminal cases.
When we speak of administering "justice" in criminal
cases, under the English or Ameriran system of procedure,
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we mean
more than
ascertaining whether
an accused is or is not guilty. It is an essential part of justice
that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined
by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights
belonging to defendants shall be respected.' (People v.
O'Bryan, 165 CaL 55, 65 [130 P. 1042], opinion of Mr. Justice
Sloss; People v. Wilson, 23 Cal.App. 513, 524 [138 P. 971] .) "
In People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 458 [249 P. 859], Mr.
Justice Shenk, speaking for a unanimous court, said : ''The
amendment by which said section 47'2 >vas added to the constitution was not 'designed to repeal or abrogate the guaranties accorded persons accused of crime by other parts of
the same constitution, &r to overthrow all statutory rules of
procedure and evidence in criminal cases.' (People v. O'Bryan,
165 Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042] ; People v. Frey, 165 Cal. 140 [131
P. 127]; People v. Wilson, 23 Cal.App. 513 [138 P. 971];
People v. Ho Kim You, 24 Cal.App. 451 [141 P. 950].)"
(Emphasis added.)
In People v. Carmichael, 198 Cal. 534, 547 [246 P. 62],
Mr. Justice Curtis speaking for this court, said: "No authority has been called to our attention which can be construed
as holding that section 4% of article VI of the constitution
can be relied upon to sustain the judgment herein. As we
have already said, in our opinion it was prejudicial error
for the court to refuse the appellant the right to examine
the jurors as to the effect on their minds of the standing of
the former jury. The ruling of the court in thus limiting
the appellant in his examination of the jurors was, in our
opinion, the deprival of the appellant of a fundamental right,
-a right to be tried by an impartial jury. It was never
intended by this provision of the constitution to take from
the defendant in a criminal action his fundamental right to
a jury trial or in any substantial manner to abridge this right
(People v. Wismer, 58 Cal.App. 679, 688 [209 P. 259] )."
In People v. Bomar, 73 Cal.App. 372, 378 [238 P. 758],
the court said: "Neither do we think that section 4% of
article VI of the constitution is applicable in the present case.
Before any accused person can be called upon to defend
himself on any charge prosecuted by information, he is entitled to a preliminary examination upon said charge, and
the judgment of the magistrate before whom such examination
is held as to whether the crime for which it is sought to
prosecute him has been committed, and whether there is suffi411 C.2d-20
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cient cause to believe him guilty thereof. These proceedings
are essential to confer jurisdiction upon the court before
whom he is placed on trial. To say that he was accorded a
fair trial upon an information filed against him without a
substantial compliance with these jurisdictional requirements,
and, therefore, that there had been no miscarriage of justice,
hardly meets the situation. Such an argument would apply
with equal force to the validity of the conviction upon an
information filed by the district attorney in a case where
no preliminary examination at all had been held. Such practice would result, in legal effect, in ;viping out all provisions
of the constitution and the Penal Code providing for preliminary examination, and in clothing the district attorney
with unlimited authority to file information against whomsoever in his judgment he might consider guilty of crime.
\Ve do not believe that it was ever the intention to extend
the scope of section 4% of article VI of the constitution to
any such limits.''
In People v. Salaz, 66 Cal.App. 173, 185 [225 P. 777], the
court said: ''While it is true that section 4% of article VI
of the constitution confers upon this court the power to
weigh, to a limited extent, the entire evidence upon which
a conviction was had. still 'we are not substituted for the
jury. We are not to determine, as an original inquiry, the
question of defendant's guilt or innocence.' We are to 'decide
whether, in our judgment, any error committed has led to
the verdict which was reached.' (People v. O'Bryan, 165
Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042].) (Italics ours.) And whenever we are
unab7e to determine whether the defendant would have been
convicted had erroneously admitted testimony been withheld
from the .i~try's consideration, this sect1:on of the constitution
cannot be applied to uphold the judgment. (People v. MacPhee, 26 Cal.App. 218 [146 P. 522]. See, also, People v.
Columbus, 49 Cal.App. 763 [194 P. 2881, Freeman v. Adams,
63 Cal.App. 225 [218 P. 600], and People v. Roe, 189 Cal. 548
[ 209 P. 560].) After a most careful consideration of the
entire cause, including the evidence, we are unable to determine whether the jury would or would not have convicted
appellant had Dr. \Vaguer's opinion as to the position of
the parties been withheld from them. This being so, we do
not think that the judgment can be upheld by reason of this
provision of the constitution." (Emphasis added.)
In People v. Abbott, 132 Cal.App. 109. 114 [22 P.2d !'5661,
the court said: "Appellant, ho\YC\cr, argues that even if
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this be true, section
of article VI of the Constitution should
rescue the case from the fate of a new trial. 1V e do not
think this const·itutional section pennits us to consider the
cm'dence of the whole case as a trial tTibunal and sustain or
reverse evm·y judgment that reaches ~ts upon our own 'verdict.' It does not intend to repeal the fundamental rights
of trial by judge and jury where witnesses appear and their
testimony may be given such weight as their words, conduct
and appearance would seem to justify. There is certainly
great doubt that the jury disregarded the court and found
defendant guilty of one of the offenses excluded by the terms
of the court's instructions. It is almost certain it did not. The
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all offenses charged
against him before being punished for them and we should
not take the chance of depriving him of such right upon
unreasonable and strained constructions and presumptions.''
(Emphasis added.)
The foregoing review of the authorities in this state relating to the application of section 41/z, article VI, of the Constitution makes it crystal clear that an error such as the one
here under review cannot be cured by the application of this
section.
·while a majority of this court has recently invoked this
section for the purpose of affirming a judgment in a case
where the appealing party had been denied the right to a
peremptory challenge of a juror, its decision is clearly contrary to all the authorities (see my dissenting opinion in
Buckley v. Chadwick filed November 8, 1955, ante, p. 183
at p. 208 [288 P.2d 12]), and it is obvious that this provision was only relied on in that case as some slight justification for the conclusion reached by the majority. In other
words the majority desired to affirm the judgment and section
4% of article VI was invoked even though the error there
committed may have deprived the appellant of his right to
a fair and impartial jury. No other case has gone this far or
even approached it. The effect of such a decision is to permit
the majority to resort to section 4% of article VI as a device
which may be used for the affirmance of any judgment regardless of the seriousness of the error committed. In my opinion
this is the situation which exists in the case at bar. To state
the matter pointedly, it simply amounts to this: A majority
of this court desire'; to affirm ;}u' judgment in this case, and
section 4l!z of article VI of the Constitution is relied upon
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to cure any error which may have occurred so far as Count 2
is concerned.
I also agree with appellant that it was prejudicial error
to admit in evidence some 200 weekly issues of Hollywood
Life, a magazine published by defendant, and to permit these
magazines to be examined by the jury during their deliberations. While these issues may have contained material evidence in support of the charges against the defendant, they
also contained many articles which had no bearing whatsoever
upon any of the offenses charged, but may have had the effect
of prejudicing the jury against the defendant. These issues
contained many articles attacking members of the police
department of San Francisco including high officials in said
department. They also contained many articles attacking
officials and employees of one of the most powerful newspaper
syndicates in California. They also contained articles attacking many public officials of San Francisco and California
including the present attorney general. None of these articles
had any bearing whatsoever upon any of the offenses charged
against the defendant. It was therefore error of the most
prejudicial character to admit in evidence the complete issues
of these magazines and permit the jury to peruse the same.
Defendant may be an undesirable character. His conduct as disclosed by the record is such that it could not help
but create resentment, animosity and ill will on behalf of
many prominent, influential people. His attacks upon most
if not all of these people appear to be wholly unjustified and
deserving of condemnation, but the problem before this court
in reviewing his conviction of the offenses charged is to determine whether or not he was accorded that fair and impartial
trial guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of this state.
Even a wicked, disreputable scandalmonger is entitled to a
fair trial before he is convicted and punished. In my opinion
the admission of the illegally obtained evidence and the issues
of the Hollywood Life magazine constituted error of such
magnitude that a fair and impartial trial was not had. Had
this evidence been excluded it is not beyond the realm of
probability that a different result may have been reached by
the jury. The jury deliberated for five days before arriving
at its verdict. This fact makes it obvious that at least some
of the jurors were not convinced as to the guilt of the defendant on all of the counts, and it may be that Count 2 was
the one regarding which the doubt existed. In this state of
the record I am convinced that the only solution which can
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be reached
this court which will be consonant with the
quality of justice which should be administered by a court of
justice, is that the judgment as to all counts should be
reversed and the defendant should be granted a new trial.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
1955.
C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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(1] Poisons-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Evidence.-In a proceeding
to forfeit an automobile used in transporting marijuana, testimony of a police officer that while four occupants were getting
from the vehicle to the sidewalk one of them dropped a can
containing marijuana into the bushes established by competent
evidence, independently of any extrajudicial statements, that
a narcotic had in fact been in the vehicle.
[2] !d.-Forfeiture of Yehicle-Forfeiture of Lien Interests.Though the legal owner of an automobile seized for transporting marijuana did not make the investigation of the purchaser's character and moral responsibility required by Health
& Saf. Code, § 11620, its interest is not subject to forfeiture
in the absence of a proper forfeiture of the registered owner's
interest, and despite the fact that she defaulted, the legal
owner may protect its own interest by asserting any defense
she may have had.
[3] !d.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Knowledge of Illegal Use.-In
order that a vehicle may be forfeited for illegal transportation
of narcotics, it is not necessary that the registered owner know
of the illegal use, since such use of property is so undesirable
that the owner surrenders his control at his peril.
[4] !d.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Purpose of Statute.-The purpose
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, §50 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6, 11] Poisons, § 17(5); [2, 7, 8]
Poisons, § 17 (4); [3, 4, 9] Poisons, § 17 (2); [5, 10] Poisons,
§ 1'7(3); [12, 13] Evidence, § 263.

